State Aids and European Community Law by Niemeyer, Hans-Jorg
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 15 Issue 1 
1993 
State Aids and European Community Law 
Hans-Jorg Niemeyer 
Gleiss, Lutz, Hootz, Hirsch and Partners, Brussels/Stuttgart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, European Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hans-Jorg Niemeyer, State Aids and European Community Law, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 189 (1993). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol15/iss1/4 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
STATE AIDS AND EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW
Dr. Hans-Jorg Niemeyer*
INTRODUCTION ............ : .................................. 190
I. STATE AIDS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.............' 191
A . Background ......................................... 191
B. The Concept of Aid within Article 92(1) of
the EEC Treaty ....... ;........................ 192
1. The Broad Concept of Aid ....................... 192
2. The Market Economy Investor Principle .......... 193
3. Sources of A id ............ ...................... 194
4. State Aid Favoring Certain Undertakings.......... 195
5. The Effect on Competition and on Trade
Between Member States ...................... 195
C. Treaty-Based Exceptions to the Prohibition
on State A ids ........................................ 196
1. Aids for Very Depressed Regions ............... 197
2. Aids to Promote an Important European Project .. 198
3. Sectoral and Regional Aids ....................... 198
4. Im plications ......................... .. ....... 199
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS .............. ..................... 199
A. Review of Existing Aid Systems (art. 93(1)) .......... 200
B. Notification of New Aids (art. 93(3)) ................. 200
C. Procedure When the Commission is Notified ......... 201
D. Procedure When the Commission is Not Notified ..... 202
E. The Contentious Procedure .......................... 203
III. REPAYMENT OF ILLEGALLY GRANTED STATE AIDS ....... 204
A. The Commission's Power to Order Repayment ....... 204
B. Compliance with the Order of Repayment ............ 205
C. Application of National Law ...... ............... 206
D. Legitimate Expectation of the Beneficiary ......... 207
* Partner, Gleiss, Lutz, Hootz, Hirsch and Partners, Brussels/Stuttgart. This is the
extended and updated version of a speech given at the seminar "Overseas Investment" orga-
nized by the International Law Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Dearborn, Michigan
on October 13, 1992.
I Michigan Journal of International Law
IV. REMEDIES .... ........................................... 208
A. Remedies Before the Court of Justice and the Court
of First Instance of the European Communities ....... 208
1. The Commission's Enforcement Remedies ........ 208
2. Other Parties' Remedies ......................... 209
3. Types of Decisions Which May Be Challenged ... 211
B. Remedies Before National Courts .................... 211
C ONCLUSION .................... . ..................... 213
INTRODUCTION
The existence of State aids can considerably influence the decision
of an investor regarding the region or sector in which to invest. State
aids can reduce substantially investors' starting and capital costs, thereby
enhancing the desirability of investing in a particular location. There-
fore, a legal -adviser should be aware of the available State aid programs
if a client is seeking a location for production facilities. In the European
Community (EC), a system has been set in place which substantially
restricts the right of EC Member States to grant aids or subsidies to
investors. The consequences of disregarding the EC provisions can be
severe. If the EC Commission finds that the aid was illegally granted, it
can order the investor to repay the entire amount of the aid.
A case which demonstrates the consequences of disregarding the EC
laws arose out of the Toyota Motor Corporation investment in Great
Britain. In 1989, Toyota decided to build a new plant to produce pas-
senger cars in England. Toyota's decision to invest in England was
influenced by the fact that the local county, which owned the building
site, offered Toyota the real estate for an inexpensive price. The EC
Commission became aware of this investment and concluded that the
difference between the market value of the building site and the price
paid by Toyota constituted illegal State aid.' The consequence was that
Toyota had to pay this difference to the county.
In light of the risks involved, -investors and legal advisers must fully
understand the EC State aid laws before embarking in any investment in
the EC. This article provides an overview of EC State aid rules, focus-
ing on recent Commission policy and recent judgments of the Court of
Justice on State aids.2 In Part I, some general points, such as what may
1. Commission Decision 92/i I/EEC of 31 July 1991 Concerning Aid Provided by the
Derbyshire County Council to Toyota Motor Corporation, 1992 O.J. (L 6) 36.
2. See, e.g., Claude Blumann, Rigime des aides d'Etat: Jurisprudence ricente de la Cour
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constitute a State aid, are considered. In Part II, the procedural aspects
are dealt with in more detail, with emphasis on the notification process,
and the procedure for reviewing State aids. Part III examines the recov-
ery of illegally granted aids, and the defenses a beneficiary may assert.
Next, Part IV sets out the remedies available for breach of the State aid
rules, including the right to contest the Commission's decisions. The
article concludes by pointing out the shortcomings of the present proce-
dures and suggesting changes that could improve the procedures, espe-
cially from the perspective of outside investors unfamiliar with the EC
rules.
I. STATE AIDS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Background
The control of State aids is part of the general competition policy in
the Community and is codified in the EEC Treaty. In order to foster
competition, the Treaty prohibits restrictions on competition by private
individuals. Further, it prohibits Member States from granting aid to
national industries that distorts, or threatens to distort, competition and
trade between Member States.
Addressing the problem of State aids has become an increasingly
important part of the Commission's competition policy in recent years.
This new focus results from the dramatic increase in aid proposals sub-
mitted to the EC Commission - from 296 in 1989, to 429 in 1990.3 By
the end of the 1980s, the total amount of subsidies granted by the
twelve Member States reached ninety billion ECU per year4 (1 ECU =
1.13 US$).
The Commission's actions in regulation of State aid have always
been controversial. Especially in times of recession, there is pressure on
national governments to provide help to economically disadvantaged
regions and industries in order to curb unemployment. Therefore, oppo-
nents of a vigorous State aid policy advocate the idea that the applica-
tion of the State aid rules should be relaxed in times of recession in
order to help those countries which are most in need.
de Justice, 361 REVUE DU MARCHI9 COMMUN ET DE L'UNION EUROPIENNE 721 (1992);
Siegfried Magiera, Rickforderung gemeinschaftsrechtswidriger staatlicher Beihilfen, in
EUROPARECHT ENERGIERECHT WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT FESTSCHRiFT FOR BORNER 213 (1992).
3. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWENTIETH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 135 (1990) [hereinafter TWENTIETH REPORT].
4. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD SURVEY ON STATE AIDS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN THE MANUFACTURING AND CERTAIN OTHER SECTORS 38 (1992).
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On the other side, supporters of an unyielding State aid policy point
out that the Europeans are still completing the internal market in the EC.
One prerequisite for its completion is the elimination of policies which
distort competition between Member States. If Member States are al-
lowed to use State aid to defend their national companies or industries
from the pressure of increased competition, these new barriers could
jeopardize the efficient allocation of resources within the single market.'
One State's aid can lead to another state's unemployment. Thus, the
supporters of the EC State aid policy argue that during a recession, a
rigorous State aid policy takes on even greater importance.
While the debate rages on, no relaxation of the policy has actually
occurred. Thus, anyone contemplating an investment in the EC would be
unwise to proceed without first consulting the applicable laws.
B. The Concept of Aid within Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty
1. The Broad Concept of Aid
The first thing an investor must determine when considering a
Member State's offer of aid is whether that offer constitutes "State aid"
as defined by the EEC Treaty. Article 92(1) of the EEC Treaty defines
State aid as "any aid granted by a Member State or through State re-
sources in any form whatsoever."'6 This broad definition encompasses a
wide variety of possible aids. It is generally agreed that it includes all
forms of positive benefit to a recipient, including actual cash subsidies,
as well as any measure that relieves an undertaking of costs it would
otherwise have to bear.7
Where a company receives a benefit from the State, and the State
receives no consideration in return, it is clear that a State aid has been
granted. In addition, given that the concept of State aid has been
interpreted broadly, a State aid exists when the value of the services or
goods provided by the investor is less than the consideration given for
them by the State, or, conversely, when the State demands less payment
than the value of the goods or services that the State provides to a
5. TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 3, at 125.
6. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art.
92(1). Treaty articles without references in the remaining text of this article refer to the EEC
Treaty.
7. Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke v. High Authority, 1961 E.C.R. 43; Case 310/855,
Deufil GmbH v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 901, 924.
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company.8
When considering sales agreements, particularly with regard to the
sale of building sites by the State to an. investor, State aid has been
granted if the terms and conditions of the sale depart from normal
commercial practice. 9 Examples of State aids are non-repayable subsi-
dies; loans from State-owned financial institutions at reduced rates;
reductions in income or corporation tax; capital injection by a public au-
thority; payment of below-market prices for energy; or the sale of real
estate at a price below the market value.
Despite the broad concept of aid, not all State measures that benefit
a company or groups of companies can be considered State aid within
the meaning of article 92(1). Rather, the purpose of the State measure
must aim at conferring a' financial advantage on the. undertakings con-
cerned, which would result in the State assuming an additional burden.'0
Therefore, a State measure whose purpose is not to confer a cost ad-
vantage to certain undertakings, but merely has consequential financial
effects, is not considered State aid."
2. The Market Economy Investor Principle
In recent years, it has become common for Member States to assist
companies, especially those involved in public undertakings, through
capital injections. In these cases, the Commission applies the so-called
"market economy investor principle."' 2 In order to determine whether
any aid' is involved, the Commission examines Whether a private in-
vestor, considering the expected return - but ignoring all social, region-
al, policy, and sectoral considerations - would have been willing to
8. Joined Cases 67, 68, & 70/85, Van der Kooy and others v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R.
219, 270; Case C-169/84, Societe CdF Chimie AZF v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3083,
1-3122.
9. Commission Decision of 14 April 1992 Concerning Aid Granted by the Land of
Berlin to Daimler-Benz AG Germany, 1992 O.J. (L 263) 15, 20.
10. Joined Cases 72 & 73/91, SIo'man Neptun Schiffahrts AG v. Seebetriebsrat (E.C.J.
March 17, 1993) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, :ECCase file)..
11. See id. German law provides the possibility for.German shipping lines to employ
nationals of third countries under less advantageous working and social conditions than
seamen protected by German labor law. Although this German legislation gives German
employers a cost advantage which results in lower social security contributions and lower
taxes for the State, these consequential financial effects are not a State aid within the meaning
of article 92(1).
12. Commission Communication Concerning Application of Articles 92 and 93 of the
EEC Treaty and of Article 5 of Commission Directive 80fl23/EEC to Public Undertakings in
the Manufacturing Sector, 1991 O.J. (C 273) 2, 6. This communication was annulled by the
Court of Justice due to the communication's failure to cite its legal basis. Case 325/91, France
v. Commission (E.C.J. June 16, 1993) (LEXIS, Intlaw library, ECCase file).
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make those contributions in a similar situation. If a private investor
would not have been able to expect an acceptable rate of profitability on
the capital invested, the capital injection is considered an aid. The Court
of Justice accepted this principle as an appropriate method for determin-
ing whether a capital injection is considered an aid. 3
In Italy v. Commission,4 the Court refined the "market economy
investor principle" by making a distinction between private investors
investing capital in the short term, and private holding groups which
have a longer-term perspective. In 1986, the Italian State-holding com-
pany Finmeccanica, which owned Alfa Romeo, carried out two capital
infusions into Alfa Romeo amounting to ECU 429 million. The Com-
mission decided that a private investor never would have made a similar
investment, because Alfa Romeo had continuous losses between 1974
and 1986, and because the capital was not provided on the condition
that Alfa Romeo rationalize its production. The Court held that where a
private holding group, even considering decisions at the level of the
whole group in a wider economic context, is not able to expect an
acceptable rate of profitability (even in the long term) on the capital
invested, the capital injection is an aid. 5
3. Sources of Aid
To be considered State aid, the aid must be granted by a Member
State or through State resources. The term "through State resources"
includes not only public bodies, but also private companies that are
under the control of the State and established or appointed to administer
the aid.'
6
Nevertheless, aid granted by a Member State, but financed from EC
funds, falls outside the scope of article 92 since the aid must come from
the financial resources of a Member State.' 7 It should be noted that in
13. Case 40/85, Belgium v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 2321, 2345, 2 C.M.L.R. 301
(1988); Case 301/87, France v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-307, 1-361.
14. Case C-305/89, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1603, 1-1640 (upholding Com-
mission Decision of 31 May 1989 Concerning Aid Provided by the Italian Government to
Alfa Romeo, 1989 O.J. (L 394) 9).
15. Case C-305/89, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1641; see also Case 303/88,
Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1433, 1-1477, 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (1993).
16. Van der Kooy and others v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 219, 272; Case C-305/89,
Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1639; see also Joined cases 72 & 73/91, Sloman
Neptun Schiffahrts v. Seebetriebsrat AG (E.C.J. March 17, 1993) (LEXIS, Intlaw library,
ECCase file); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NINETEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 156 (1989) [hereinafter NINETEENTH REPORT].
17. Joined Cases 213 & 215/8 1, Norddeuisches Vieh- und Fleischkontor v. BALM, 1982
E.C.R. 3583, 3602.
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recent years, the Commission has become one of the largest financial
backers in Europe. Almost 64 billion ECU are available in the budget of
the EC for Community subsidies.
4. State Aid Favoring Certain Undertakings
Only those State aids that are granted to certain undertakings or to
all undertakings within a particular industry fall within article 92. Thus,
public funds paid out to all undertakings in a Member State are not
considered to be State aids. While this distinction is simple enough, the
favoring of certain undertakings or sectors is not always obvious. For
example, an Italian measure reduced the health insurance costs of all
female workers. Upon closer examination, the Commission determined
that this measure constituted State aid since it disproportionately bene-
fited textile companies, which employed an above average number of
women. 18
5. The Effect on Competition and on Trade Between Member States
Finally, for a State aid to fall within article 92, it must distort or
threaten to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings and must
affect trade between Member States. In order to determine whether
competition and trade between Member States is affected, the Commis-
sion has to examine the relevant market, the position of the recipient of
the aid, the volume of inter-State trade, and the exports of the company
concerned.19 The standard of evidence for distortion is quite low. The
Court of Justice has adopted a broad approach in determining whether
State aid distorts or threatens to distort competition.2' The Court argues
that where competition between companies in various Member States
exists, any financial aid is capable of dis torting competition. The aid
artificially strengthens the position of the recipient company, and this
hinders the ability of other producers to increase their market shares and
exports. This principle applies even if the recipient of the State aid is
not engaged in exports. It is sufficient that the aid enables undertakings
to maintain or increase their production, thereby reducing the oppor-
tunities of competitors from other Member States to export their goods
18. Upheld by the ECJ in Case 203/82, Commission v. Italy,'1983 E.C.R. 2525.
19. See, e.g., Joined Cases 296 & 318/82, Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papienvaren-
fabriek v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 809, 824.
20. Case C-305/89, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1603, 1-1642; Case 730/79,
Philip Morris v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2671, 2688.
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into the recipient's country.21 Even a relatively small amount of State
aid may affect trade between the Member States if there is vigorous
competition in that sector, or if the profit margins are small, such as in
the textile industry.22
Additionally, unlike other competition cases, no de minimis thresh-
old applies in State aid cases. Consequently, the relatively small size of
the recipient of a State aid does not exclude a priori the effect on in-
ter-State trade.23 As a consequence, the Commission does not have to
provide evidence that trade between Member States is actually affected.
It is sufficient that the aid may affect inter-State trade.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that not all aids have a perceptible
impact on trade and competition between Member States. This is true
especially of aid provided in very small amounts, mainly though not
exclusively, to, small and medium-sized companies, and often under
schemes run by local or regional authorities. Based on past experience,
the Commission has set a de minimis figure at payments of ECU 50,000
to one undertaking for a particular type of expenditure - such as in-
vestment or training - over a three-year period. This rule applies to all
companies, notwithstanding their size. State aids below this de minimis
figure do not fall under article 92(1).24
C. Treaty-Based Exceptions to the Prohibition on State Aids
Article 92(2) provides that certain social aids, subsidies to remove
damages caused by natural disasters, and aids to compensate for eco-
nomic disadvantages caused by the division of Germany, are per se
allowable. There is no need to notify the Commission before imple-
menting such aids.
Much more important in practice are the exemptions under article
92(3). Under article 92(3) the Commission has the discretion to exempt
aids falling into the three main categories: (1) aid for very depressed
regions; (2) aid to promote the execution of an important project of
common interest or to remedy a serious disturbance in a Member State's
economy; and (3) regional and sectoral aid.
21. Case C-303/88, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1433, 1-1477; Case 102/87,
France v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R. 4067, 4087.
22. Case C-303/88, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1477; Case 259/85, France v.
Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4393, 4418.
23. Case C-142/87, Belgium v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-959, 1-1015.
24. Commission Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises, 1992 O.J. (C 213) 2, 5.
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The Commission has broad discretion to authorize a State aid under
these three categories. The Court of Justice has been quite reserved in
examining the Commission's discretion as long as the Commission's
decision was reasonably substantiated.25
1. Aids for Very Depressed Regions
The Commission has set out principles for approving national re-
gional aid under article 92(3)(a).26 It is sufficient to say that regional
aids are only justified for areas which have severe regional problems in
relation to the Community as a whole (and not just in relation to the
Member State) .27 The socioeconomic situation of article 92(3)(a) regions
is assessed primarily by reference to the purchasing power standards
(PPS) based on the Gross National Product.28 The article 92(3)(a) re-
gions are Greece, Ireland, and Portugal (all of the States), parts of Italy
and Spain, and Northern Ireland. 29 The Commission allows aid of up to
seventy-five percent of the total investment, depending on the intensity
or urgency of the regional problems. With respect to the type of aid, it
allows regional aid linked to initial investment or job creation, as well
as, under certain circumstances, operating aid designed to overcome
particular or permanent disadvantage. 30 As an example, the Commission
did not object to State aids granted by the Portuguese government to the
automotive components manufacturer Delco Remy,3' or to a Portuguese
aid granted to the Ford/Volkswagen joint venture 32 to build a minivan.
In both cases, the subsidies amounted to more than thirty percent of the
investment costs.
25. Case C-303/88, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-1479; Case C-301/87, France
v. Commission 1990 E.C.R. 1-307, 1-363.
26. Commission Communication on the Method for the Application of Article 92(3)(a)
and (c) to Regional Aid, 1988 O.J. (C 212) 2 [hereinafter 1988 Communication Concerning
Regional Aid]; Commission Communication on the Method for the Application of Article
92(3)(a) and (c) to Regional Aid, 1990 O.J. (C 163) 6 [hereinafter 1990 Communication
Concerning Regional Aid].
27. Case 248/84, Germany v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4013, 4042, I C.M.L.R. 591,
608 (1989); Case 730/79, Philip Morris Holland B.V. v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2671,
2691-92, 2 C.M.L.R. 321, 342 (1981).
28. 1988 Communication Concerning Regional Aid, supra note 26, at 2.
29. See id. at 6-7 (listing art. 93(3)(a) areas).
30. Id. at 3.
31. TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 3, at 161.
32. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TWENTY-FIRST REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 152 (1991) [hereinafter TWENTY-FIRST REPORT]; Ford Motor Company and
Volkswagen AG, upheld by the Court of Justice, Case C-225/91, Matra SA v. Commission
(E.C.J. June 15, 1993).
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Due to the restrictive application by the Commission, the signifi-
cance of article 92(3)(a) is low, and most of the national regional aids
are examined as regional or sectoral aids under article 92(3)(c), which is
discussed below in Part I.C.3.33
2. Aids to Promote an Important European Project
Projects that fall into this category are European transnational pro-
grams supported jointly by various governments, or concerted action
taken by the various Member States to combat a common problem such
as the pollution of the environment.34 Furthermore, any aid granted to
companies for their participation in research and development projects
of common European interest may also qualify under article 92(3)(b)."
3. Sectoral and Regional Aids
Under article 92(3)(c), the Commission may authorize two different
types of State aids: sectoral aids promoting certain industrial sectors, and
regional aids promoting a certain area within the EC.36 Thus, regional
aids may be authorized under subsection (a) as well as (c). Under sub-
section (c), aid measures can be justified for regions that are disadvan-
taged in relation to other parts of the same Member State as a result of
factors such as lower income or higher unemployment than the Member
State average.
The Commission has set up several notices and Community frame-
works on sectoral aid schemes for industries such as textile, shipbuild-
ing, or motor vehicles.37 Such frameworks have also been set up for
regional aid schemes. 3' These notices provide guidelines for the assess-
ment of such aids.
There are a number of basic criteria for determining the propriety of
the aid. The aid scheme must be clear enough so that the Commission
can be able to determine the type of aid. Also, the purpose of the aid
33. Dieter Birkenmaier, Beihilfen Wettbewerbsrecht und Weltbewerbspolitik in der EG, in
WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITISCHE BLTTER 73, 78 (1992).
34. Joined Cases 62 & 72/87, Exdcutif Regional Wallon v. Commission, 1988 E.C.R.
1573, 1594-95, 2 C.M.L.R. 771, 785-86 (1989).
35. TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 3 , at 140-43.
36. Moreover, this provision applies to other general State aid schemes and so-called
horizontal aids. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTEENTH REPORT ON
COMPETITION POLICY 138 (1987) [hereinafter SIXTEENTH REPORT].
37. TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 32, at 288-301, 305-306.
38. See, e.g., 1988 Communication Concerning Regional Aid, supra note 26; 1990
Communication Concerning Regional Aid, supra note 26.
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must comply with the objectives of the Community. In the' case of in-
dustry sectors in crisis, subsidies are inappropriate where their sole
effect would be to maintain the status quo. They have to be linked to
restructuring plans by which the company is enabled to become viable.3
Where overcapacity exists, aid for investment must not result in capacity
increases.' The aids must be degressive, well-adapted to the restructur-
ing of the specific sector, and the intensity of the aid must be propor-
tional to the aid's objective.4 '
The Commission has generally shown a positive attitude towards
regional aids, especially if the aid is granted for the implementation of
new production plants in disadvantaged parts of the Community. 42 Here
the ceiling for aids is between twenty to thirty percent of the investment
costs. 43 In contrast, the Commission does not authorize operating aids,
such as monetary infusions which are not linked to restructuring plans,
even in disadvantaged regions.
4. Implications
Considering all the different guidelines and frameworks, there are
many possibilities for the Commission to authorize State aids under
article 92(3). Thus, it appears that the Commission's State aid control is
actually quite lenient. This view is confirmed by the fact that from 429
notifications in 1990, the Commission decided that only twelve State
aids were illegal. 44
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
Article 93 gives the Commission a general right of supervision over
State aids. It provides for a procedure that permits the Commission to
force Member States to abolish or to suspend State aids which are
incompatible with article 92. Article 93 distinguishes between existing
aids and new aids, which have different procedural treatments.
39. See Commission Notice Pursuant to Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty to Other
Member States and other Parties Concerned Regarding Aid which France Has Decided to
Grant Compagnie des Machines Bull, 1992 O.J. (C 244) 2, 7.
40. NINETEENTH REPORT, supra note 16, at 163-64 (authorizing capital injection
covering more than 30% of the restructuring costs); COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITIES, EIGHTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 175-76 (1989) (approving a subsidy
intensity of 25%).
41. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EIGHTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 124 (1979).
42. TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 32, at 152.
43. 1988 Communication Concerning Regional Aid, supra note 26, at 5.
44. TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 3, at 135.
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A. Review of Existing Aid Systems (art. 93(1))
An existing aid is one which was either in operation at the time the
EEC Treaty came into force, or which was in operation at the time a
new Member State joined the EC (like Spain and Portugal in 1986).
Aids that were properly implemented after that time with the consent of
the Commission are also treated as existing aids. Such existing aids are
legal and can remain in force until the Commission requires their aboli-
tion or alteration.
Article 93(l) provides that the Commission must constantly review
the propriety of existing aids. For example, a regional aid may have
been authorized by the Commission, but due to the improvement of the
economic situation in that region, the aid is no longer justified.45 In such
a case, the Commission shall rule that the State concerned must alter or
abolish the State aid after having carried out the contentious procedure
set out in article 93(2).46 Such a decision does not have a retroactive
effect. Recovery of the aid may only be ordered with respect to those
aids granted by a Member State after the Commission decided on the
abolition of the aid.
B. Notification of New Aids (art. 93(3))
The most important procedural rule is the notification procedure for
new aids set forth in article 93(3). Member States are obliged to notify
the Commission of any plans to grant new aids or to alter existing aids.
There is, however, no such obligation to notify other parties, such as the
recipient of the aid.47 The Commission has set a new threshold of ECU
50,000 below which an individual aid is no longer subject to prior
notification to the Commission. This amount does not, however, apply
for certain sensitive sectors subject to special rules such as the ship-
building or the motor vehicle industry.4
The last sentence of article 93(3) provides that the Member States
are prevented from putting an aid scheme into effect, and especially
from paying out the subsidy, until the Commission has declared the
State aid compatible with the Common Market. This prohibition, known
45. Id. at 128.
46. Case 120/73, Lorenz v. Germany, 1973 E.C.R. 1471, 1484. The contentious proce-
dure is described infra, part I1.E.
47. Case 91/83, Heineken v. Inspector of Corp. Taxes, 1984 E.C.R. 3435, 3452.
48. Commission Community Guidelines on State Aid for Small and Medium-Sized
Enterprises, supra note 24, at 5.
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as the stand-still clause,49 is directly actionable. It provides rights attach-
ing to individuals which must be protected by national courts. If the aid
was implemented without observance of the prior review procedure
under article 93(2) and (3), i.e., without notification or between a notifi-
cation and the Commission's decision, national courts have the power to
safeguard the rights of individuals against this disregard by the Member
State's authorities.'
C. Procedure When the Commission is Notified
Once the notification of State aid by the Member State was properly
made, the Commission must follow procedure in ruling on the propriety
of the aid. The Commission must form its initial opinion on the notifi-
cation within a two-month preliminary period of investigation. By the
end of this two month period, the Commission must render its prelimi-
nary assessment of whetherthe aid falls within the scope of article 92(1)
and whether it may be exempted under article 92(3). If the Commission
has failed to rule on the notification during this preliminary period, the
Member State may implement the plan, but must give prior notice of
this implementation to the Commission.5
The Commission's failure to make a preliminary assessment does
not, however, prevent the Commission from continuing its procedure.
The aid granted in the interim period merely becomes an existing aid
and is subject to review under article 93(1) and (2). As in the case of an
existing aid, a decision to abolish a new aid can have prospective effect
only, and therefore the Commission may not require aid granted in the
interim period to be repaid.
On the basis of the preliminary examination, the Commission can
make two "decisions." If the Commission raises no objections, it can
authorize the aid. The, Commission informs the Member State of the
authorization in an informal letter. in addition, the authorization can be
published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. If,
however, the Commission has serious doubts at the end of the two
month period, it must open the so-called contentious procedure under
article 93(2).
49. Case C-312/90, Spain v. Commission, (E.C.J. June 30, 1992); See Case 120/73,
Lorenz v. Commission, 1973 E.C.R. at 1481.
50. Case C-354/90, Federation Nationale de Commerce Extdrieur des Produits
Alimentaires (FNCE) et Syndicat National des Ndgociants et Transformateurs de Saumon v.
France, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5505. For further details, see infra part IV.B.
51. Case C-312/90, Spain v. Commission, (E.C.J. June 30, 1992); Lorenz v. Commission,
1973 E.C.R. at 1481.
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D. Procedure When the Commission is Not Notified
If a Member State implements a new aid without notifying the
Commission, but the aid nevertheless comes to the Commission's notice,
the Commission evaluates the aid in the following manner.52
The Commission first asks the Member State for all information
necessary for the Commission to determine whether the aid is compati-
ble with the Common Market. If the Member State does not reply, or if
the reply is incomplete, the Commission may take a provisional step by
requiring the Member State to suspend the operation of the aid scheme
and to inform the Commission of the manner of its compliance with the
decision within 15 days.53
If the Member State complies with this provisional decision, the
Commission is obliged to examine the aid pursuant to article 93(2) and
(3). If the Member State fails to comply with the provisional decision,
the Commission can proceed to a final decision on the legality of the
aid. The Commission may prohibit the aid in a final decision under
article 93(2) on the basis of the information in its possession since the
Member State opted. not to offer any additional information. In this
(final) decision, the Commission can, if necessary, seek repayment of
the amount of the aid already granted. If the Member State fails to
comply with either a provisional decision or a negative final decision,
the Commission may refer the matter directly to the Court of Justice
pursuant to article 93(2), subparagraph 2, and apply for interim
measures if necessary.
It should be noted that the failure to notify the Commission of a
new aid does not render the aid automatically unlawful. Thus, the Com-
mission cannot declare aid illegal solely because the Member State has
failed to meet its obligation to notify. As stated above, the Commission
is obliged to examine the 'aid pursuant to article 93(3) and has to open
the contentious procedure under article 93(2) if it intends to prohibit the
aid. If the parties do not submit additional information or comments,
however, the Commission may make a final decision on the basis of the
information in its possession.
52. Case C-301/87, France v'. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-307, 1-356; TWENTIETH
REPORT, supra note 3, at 129; TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 32, at 302.
53. See, e.g., TWENTY-FIRST REPORT, supra note 32, at 166-67 (discussing the case of
Pari Mutuel Urbain).
54. Case C-303/88, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1- 1433, 1-1482-83; Case C-301/87,
France v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-307, 1-357; TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 3, at 129.
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E. The Contentious Procedure
The Commission must open the contentious procedure if it has
serious difficulties in assessing whether or not the State aid is compati-
ble with the Common Market. In particular, this occurs when only a
complex analysis of the market, and further investigations of the under-
takings in the affected market, can resolve such serious difficulties. 5
The significance of an investment or an aid per se, however, cannot
constitute such serious difficulties.. Otherwise, the Commission would
have to open the contentious procedure in all cases where the invest-
ment or the aid exceeds certain thresholds. 6
The contentious procedure starts with the Commission announcing
the initiation of the procedure in the Official Journal. It invites the
interested parties - the Member States, the recipient, and the competi-
tors in all Member States - to submit their comments. The recipient of
the aid does not have to be informed individually.57 The Commission
then examines the views of all the interested parties. The Member State
concerned is also given the opportunity to comment on any submissions
made by third parties if the Commission intends to base its 'decision on
such submissions.5.
If the Commission finds that the aid is not compatible with article
92, the Member State must abolish the aid. In addition, the Commission
may require the repayment of the aid if it was unlawfully paid to the
recipient. If the Commission raises no objections, it then authorizes the
aid, sometimes subject to certain alterations. All decisions, whether for
or against the aid, must be published in the Official Journal.
There is no time limit within which the Commission must reach a
decision under article 93(2). However, in a case where the procedure
lasted twenty-six months, and the Commission offered no justification
for the delay, the Court of Justice considered the procedure unreasonab-
ly long and annulled the Commission's subsequent decision.59
Finally, it should be noted that the Court requires the Commission
to observe the article 93 procedure strictly. For example, in British
Aerospace and Rover v. Commission, the Court annulled the Commis-
55. Case C-198/91, William Cook v. Commission (E.C.J. May 19, 1993).
56. See, e.g., Case C-225/91, Matra SA v. Commission (E.C.J. June 15, 1993).
57. Case 323/82, SA Intermills v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 3809, 3827.
58. Case C-142/87, Belgium v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-959, 1-1016..
59. Case 223/85, RSV v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4617, 4659.
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sion decision on purely procedural grounds. 60 In that case, the British
government had granted certain benefits to British Aerospace in connec-
tion with its acquisition of the Rover group. The EC Commission autho-
rized that State aid, subject to certain conditions. Later, information was
revealed indicating that the Government had granted further financial
concessions of approximately forty-four million British pounds. The
Commission, concluding that these concessions were illegal aid, issued
a decision requiring Great Britain to recover the extra concessions from
the recipient.
The Court reviewed the Commission's decision and held that the
Commission did not comply with the procedural rules provided in article
93. The Court determined that when the Commission found the further
aid illegal, it should have done two things. Since the extra aid constitut-
ed a breach of the conditions and terms of the earlier decisions, the
Commission should have referred the matter directly to the Court of
Justice pursuant to article 93(2), subparagraph 2. Also, since there was a
new aid which had not been examined previously through the proper
procedure, the Commission should have opened a contentious procedure
(art. 93 (2)), which includes a hearing of the interested parties. Since the
Commission's decision merely required the recipient to repay the mon-
ey, without giving the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard, the
Court annulled the decision.
III. REPAYMENT OF ILLEGALLY GRANTED STATE AIDS
A. The Commission's Power to Order Repayment
A Commission decision to abolish illegal State aid would be without
practical effect if the Commission could not require the Member State
concerned to recover this illegal aid from the recipient. It is thus well
established in Community law that the Commission has the power to
require such recovery, including the interest accrued on the granted
aid.61 The aid is not always repaid to the Member State, but rather to the
institution granting the aid, and never to the Commission.
The Commission has discretion over whether or to what extent the
aid must be reimbursed. This enables the Commission to take into
60. Case 292/90, British Aerospace and Rover v. Commission, I C.M.L.R. 853 (1992).
61. As of 1988, 22 Commission decisions ordered repayment of aids in the amount of
approximately one billion ECU. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SEVEN-
TEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 139 (1988). Also see the list of decisions ordering
recovery in Commission's answer to the Written Question No. 2716/90, 1991 O.J. (C 177) 1.
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consideration the particularity of each case. In exercising its discretion,
the Commission has to respect the principle of proportionality and the
principle of respect of legitimate expectation.62
B. Compliance with the Order of Repayment
If the Commission orders the recovery of aid payments, article 173
(subparts 2 and 3) allows the Member State, as the addressee of such
order, to appeal the decision within a two-month period. When this time
limit expires, the Commission's decision becomes final. The Member
State must then carry out all appropriate measures to recover the aid
payments from the recipient of the aid.63
There is an established principle that a Member State may not claim
that provisions, practices, or circumstances existing in its legal system
justify its failure to comply with obligations resulting from Community
law.64 The Member State must use all the power at its disposal to secure
repayment including, if necessary, exercising its rights as shareholder or
creditor to wind up the company.65 The Member State may only plead
that compliance with the order is absolutely impossible. 66 Therefore,
financial difficulties of the aided undertaking do not make compliance
with the Commission's decision an "absolute impossibility. 67 Since the
purpose of ordering repayment is to remove the effects of an unlawful
aid, where the recipient survived solely because of the aid, a necessary
consequence of the order of repayment is to force the recipient into
liquidation. Furthermore, a Commission decision ordering the suppres-
sion of the aid by means of repayment of the amount paid is not out of
proportion with the illegal act but simply the logical consequence of the
illegality of the aid.68
62. Case C-301/87, France v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-307; Case 310/85, Deufil v.
Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 901, 928. The principle of proportionality is that the individual
should not have his freedom of action limited beyond the degree necessary for the public
interest. The principle of respect of legitimate expectation is explained infra, part III.D.
63. Case 94/87, Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 175, 191.
64. See Case C-375/89, Commission v. Belgium, 1991 E.C.R. 1-383.
65. Case 52/84, Commission v. Belgium, 1986 E.C.R. 89, 104; Case C-142/87, Belgium
v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-959.
66. Case 52/84, Commission v. Belgium, 1986 E.C.R. at 104; Case 94/87, Commission
v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. at 191.
67. Case 63/87, Commission v. Greece, 1988 E.C.R. 2875.
68. Case C-142/87, Belgium v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-1020; Case C-305/89, Italy
v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1603, 1-1645.
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Any difficulties in the implementation of the Commission's decision
have no influence on its legality. If, however, the aided undertaking
were to go into liquidation whereby its property and assets were surren-
dered to its creditors and the Member State exercised all rights as credi-
tor in the winding up procedure for the amount of aid paid, then the
Member State would have adequately complied with its obligations
under the Commission's order.69
If a Member State finds that there are difficulties in carrying out a
Commission decision ordering recovery, then, rather than ignoring the
decision, the Member State should submit proposals to the Commission,
pursuant to article 5 of the EEC Treaty, for suitable amendments to the
decision.7° However, it is not sufficient to merely inform the Commis-
sion of legal and practical difficulties with respect to the recovery,
before actually trying to secure payment from the recipient and before
submitting proposals for suitable amendments.7'
C. Application of National Law
European Community law does not provide rules for the actual
recovery of unlawful State aids. In the absence of such provisions, the
national authorities must proceed in accordance with the procedural and
substantive rules of their own national law regarding the recovery of
monies which were improperly paid.72 The application of national law
is, however, subject to the limit imposed by Community law. Accord-
ingly, national law must be applied in a manner that does not make the
recovery virtually impossible.73 As an example, in Commission v.
Germany,74 the German government argued that under German law, the
State may require recovery of the aid only within a limited time' period
and that this period had already expired. The Court denied this argument
and held that since Community law prevails over national law, the
application of national law must not make the Community obligation of
repayment impossible in practice.
Moreover, the application of national law must not affect the scope
69. Case C-142/87, Belgium:v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-1019-20; NINETEENTH
REPORT, supra note 16, at 179.
70. Case 94/87, Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. at 192; Case C-303/88, Italy v.
Commission, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-484.
71. Case C-183/91, Commission v. Greece (E.C.J. June 10, 1993).
72. Joined Cases 205-215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Germany, 1983 E.C.R.
2633, 2665-66; Case C-142/87, Belgium v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-1019.
73. Case 94/87, Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. at 192.
74. Case C-5/89, Commission v. Germany, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3437, 1-3456, 1-3458.
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and effectiveness of Community law.75 The Community interest in
recovery, of unduly paid aid must be fully taken into consideration.76
Thus, the exercise of any discretion in determining whether or not it
would be expedient to demand recovery of the aid is not permitted if
Community law requires such recovery.77 The fact that national law does
not provide rules and procedures for recovering unduly paid aid does
not affect the Member States' obligation to recover such aid.78
D. Legitimate Expectation of the Beneficiary
If the recipient relied on the legality of the aid, requiring repayment
of the aid may conflict with the principle of protecting the legitimate
expectations of the beneficiary of an aid. This principle is part of the
legal order of the Community. 79 Therefore, a recipient may attempt to
argue that, based upon his good faith reliance on theMember State's
compliance with the law of State aids, his acceptance of the aid is pro-
tected and, thus, he is not obliged to refund the aid granted him illegal-
ly.8" In certain circumstances, this argument may be persuasive.
A beneficiary is not justified in relying on the compliance of an aid
with EC law when the Commission is reviewing the aid prior to reach-
ing a final decision under article 93. Consequently, if an aid is granted
during the pending Commission review, the recipient bears the risk that
the aid be considered illegal by the Commission and must be repaid. An
exception could be where the Commission unreasonably delayed -the
proceeding without justification for the delay. Here, the recipient may
have been legitimately justified in expecting that the Commission would
not object to the aid.8'
A recipient might try simply to argue that he relied on the Member
State to observe the Community procedures. The notification of new
aids under article 93(3) is, however, a fundamental obligation imposed
on the Member States. Thus, a recipient who obtained an aid from a
Member State must realize that this aid has to be notified to the Com-
75. Joined Cases 205-215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Germany, 1983 E.C.R. at
2666.
76. Case 94/87, Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. at 192.
77. Joined Cases 205-215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Germany, 1983 E.C.R. at
2666.
78. Case C-303/88, Italy v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1433, 1-1485.
79. Case C-5/89, Commission v. Germany, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3437, 1-3456-57.
80.. See id. at 1-3457.
81. Case 223/85, RSV v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 4617, 4659 (where the procedure
lasted 26 months, and the Commission did not justify the delay, the Court of Justice annulled
the Commission's decision requiring the repayment of the aid).
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mission, and that in the case of failure of the Member State to do so,
recovery of the aid may be required.82 Consequently, the recipient is not
justified in simply trusting that the Member State has complied with its
obligation under article 93. Rather, the recipient should verify personally
whether the Commission has been notified. The Court of Justice termed
this the concept of the "diligent recipient," whose task is to make sure
that the procedure has been complied with. 3 Thus, if a beneficiary failed
to verify whether there had been a notification, it would be impossible,
in principle, for him to rely on legitimate expectation.
In sum, recipients of State aid can only invoke the protection of the
principle of legitimate expectation if the aid had been granted in accor-
dance with the notification procedure laid down in article 93, and if the
aid was not granted prior to a final Commission decision. Nevertheless,
there may be exceptional cases where a recipient may establish legiti-
mate expectation although the aid was granted without observing these
procedural requirements.8 4 This might occur where an undertaking was
granted an "atypical State aid," which the Commission considered State
aid because of the concept's broad definition, 85 and the undertaking is
not familiar with the EC law.
86
IV. REMEDIES
A. Remedies Before the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance of the European Communities
1. The Commission's Enforcement Remedies
If the Member State does not comply with a decision prohibiting an
aid, the Commission may enforce its decision by referring the matter
directly to the Court of Justice, pursuant to article 93(2), subparagraph
2. In contrast to articles 169 and 170, no formal notice and no issuance
of a reasoned opinion to the Member State is necessary. Together with
its complaint under article 93(2), subparagraph 2, the Commission can
apply for interim measures by the Court of Justice, pursuant to article
186, should the Member State fail to comply with the Commission's
82. Case 94/87, Commission v. Germany, 1989 E.C.R. 175, 187-88.
83. Case C-5/89, Commission v. Germany, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-3457.
84. Id.
85. See supra part I.B.I.
86. See Magiera, supra note 2, 228-29.-
87. British Aerospace and Rover v. Commission, I C.M.L.R. 853.
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decision requiring it to abolish an aid.8
The Commission has the same right of referral if a Member State
fails to comply with a so-called "provisional" decision. Such a provi-
sional decision requires the Member State to suspend the operation of an
aid which has not been notified or which has been implemented before
the Commission has ruled on the aid.89
2. Other Parties' Remedies
Pursuant to article 173(1), a Member State may appeal a Commis-
sion decision requiring the Member State to abolish and to recover the
aid granted.
In two recent cases,' the Court of Justice held that a Member State
may challenge a Commission decision to initiate the contentious proce-
dure under article 93(2). The Cour ireasoned that such a Commission
decision was not an interim measure since it had binding legal effects
on the Member State. First, the decision prohibited the Member State
from implementing the aid measure before the article 93(2) procedure
was complete. Furthermore, the decision was more than a preparatory
measure, the illegality of which could have been challenged in the final
decision. Even if the Commission were to authorize the aid in its final
decision this would not have the consequence of remedying a posteriori
the implementation of that aid.9'
In contrast, the Commission's decision to initiate a procedure in
competition and anti-dumping proceedings, is only an intermediate
measure whose purpose is to prepare for a final decision, and is there-
fore not reviewable by the Court of Justice.92
In principle, a Member State can obtain interim relief against a
Commission decision pursuant to article 186 provided that the Member
State can prove that it will suffer serious and irreparable damage. Never-
theless, the Member State cannot obtain interim relief by arguing that its
national industry or the recipient would suffer such grave and
88. Cases 31 & 53n77, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1977 E.C.R. 921, 2 C.M.L.R.
359 (1977).
89. See supra part ll.D.
90. Case C-312/90, Spain v. Commission, (E.C.J. June 30, 1992); Case 47/91, Italy v.
Commission (E.C.J June 30, 1992).
91. ECJ, C-312/90, Spain v. Commission, Judgement of 30 June 1992, points 20, 21 and
23.
92. Case 60/81, IBM v. Commission, 1981 E.C.R. 2639, 2654; Joined Cases 133 &
150/87, Nashua v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-719, 1-743; Case T-64/89, Automec v. Com-
mission, 1990 E.C.R. 11-367 (Court of First Instance).
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irreparable harm. In that case, the recipient itself would have to apply
for interim measures.93
Whether the recipient of an aid is entitled directly to Challenge a
Commission decision prohibiting an aid is not entirely clear. Pursuant to
article 173(2), any undertaking is entitled to institute proceedings against
a decision addressed to another person, if this decision is of direct and
individual concern to that undertaking. The Court of Justice has held
that where the intended recipient was a single undertaking, or where the
intended recipients of the proposed aid constituted a closed category of
undertakings, the decision could be challenged by those undertakings. In
contrast, if there is a large number of intended recipients who do not
constitute a closed category of undertakings, the recipients may not di-
rectly challenge the decision. On the other hand, a body established
under public law to represent those undertakings, or a trade association,
can have sufficient standing under article 173(2) if it actively participat-
ed in the administrative proceedings before the Commission.94
A more difficult question is whether competitors of the recipient of
an aid may challenge the aid by claiming that they will be prejudiced by
the aid measure. In order to answer this question, one must first distin-
guish between the challenge to a formal decision (subsequent to the
contentious procedure), and the challenge to a Commission authorization
on the basis of the preliminary assessment within the two-month period.
3. Types of Decisions Which May Be Challenged
a. Challenge to Formal Decisions
With respect to the formal decision, the Court of Justice has applied
the same principle as it did in the context of competition and anti-
dumping proceedings. In order to meet the article 173(2) requirement
that the measure be of direct and individual concern, two conditions
must be satisfied: (1) the undertaking must have participated in the
Commission investigation into 'the proposed aid. Participation is likely to
be found particularly where that undertaking made the complaint which
led to the opening of the investigation procedure, or where it submitted
its comments during the contentious procedure laid down in article
93(2); and (2) where the position of that undertaking on the market
significantly is affected by the proposed aid.
93. Case 356/90 R, Belgium v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. 2423, 2429.
94. Joined Cases 67, 68 & 70/85, Van der Kooy and others v. Commission 1988 E.C.R.
219, 268, 2 C.M.L.R. 804 (1989); Case 730/79, Philip Morris v. Commission, 1980 E.C.R.
2671, 2687, 2 C.M.L.R. 321 (1981).
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If these requirements are met, the undertaking is entitled to initiate
proceedings under article 173(2) to challenge a decision authorizing the
aid.95 In Cdf Chimie Azf v. Commission, the Court of Justice, for the first
time, annulled a Commission decision authorizing an aid upon substan-
tive grounds where the action was brought by a third party.
96
b. Challenge to Preliminary Assessments
Until recently, the question of whether competing companies are
entitled under article 173(2) to appeal a Commission authorization of an
aid after the two-month investigation period has been the subject of
controversy. Three recent decisions by the Court of Justice, however,
have laid the controversy to rest by confirming the right to such an
appeal.97 In its test of direct and individual concern in article 173(2), the
Court did not require the plaintiff to have participated in the Commis-
sion's preliminary two-month investigation, as it did with respect to
formal opinions. This is not contradictory, since a notice of a State aid
is not published in the Official Journal and, very often, competitors
become aware of the preliminary investigation of an aid measure only
by chance. Thus, it would be unfair to make the right to challenge the
preliminary authorization dependent upon the competitor's participation
in the investigation.
B. Remedies Before National Courts
Article 93 provides that the Commission has the exclusive compe-
tence (subject to Council actions in exceptional circumstances) to review
State aid systems. The Court .of Justice concluded from this that article
92, which declares State aids incompatible with the common market
subject to a few exceptions, does not have direct effect. Consequently, it
cannot be invoked by individuals in proceedings before national courts. 98
This is in contrast with article 85(2), which provides national courts
with the power to declare anti-competitive arrangements void.
While national courts may not directly rule on the propriety of State
aids, these courts may apply article 92 in certain circumstances. This
may occur when a national court is presented with a challenge to a State
95. Case 169/84, Cofaz v. Commission, 1986 E.C.R. 391, 3 C.M.L.R. 385 (1986).
96. Case C-169/84, Societe Cdf Chimie Azf v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3083.
97. See CIRFS v. Commission, Case 313/90 (E.C.J. March 24, 1993); William Cook v.
Commission, Case C-198/91 (E.C.J. May 19, 1993); Matra-SA v. Commission, Case 225/91
(E.C.J. June 15, 1993).
98. Case 74/76, Iannelli v. Aleroni, 1977 E.C.R. 557, 574-75; Case 78/76, Steinike and
Weinlig v. Germany, 1977 E.C.R. 595, 609.
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aid under the stand-still clause, contained in the last sentence of article
93(3), which is the only part of articles 92 and 93 that has direct ef-
fect.9 9 The stand-still clause prohibits a state from (1) putting an aid into
effect without first notifying the Commission, and (2) from putting a
new aid system into effect after notification, but before the Commission
has ruled on its legality. Since this clause has direct effect, a private
party can seek a declaration from a national court that the implemen-
tation of an aid violates article 93(3). The national court then must
decide whether the State measure concerned is an aid within the mean-
ing of article 92 before it can determine whether the State breached the
stand-still clause. 1°
Until recently, it has been unclear what effect the breach of these
provisions has on the aid measures themselves. With regard to the
Commission procedure under article 93(2), the Court of Justice held that
the Commission is not entitled to consider an aid illegal solely on the
ground that the obligation to notify was disregarded.' 0' The Commission
still must examine the aid under article 92.
With regard to proceedings before national courts, in a recent case,
FNCEPA v. France,"°2 the Court of Justice took a different view. In
1982, the Commission initiated the article 93(2) procedure to determine
the legality of a French State aid measure in the fishery sector. In April
1985, the French government implemented the aid. In October 1985, the
Commission informed the French government by an informal letter that
it had no objections to the State aid measure and intended to close the
files. Then, an action was brought against France before a French court
contesting the validity of the aid measure since it was introduced in
derogation of the stand-still obligation under the last sentence of article
93(3). The French Conseil d'Etat requested the Court of Justice to give
a preliminary ruling under article 177 on the decisive question: is an aid
measure which was implemented in violation of the stand-still clause,
remedied a posteriori if the Commission declares, in its final decision,
the aid measure compatible with the Common Market?
The Court of Justice answered this question in the negative. The
Court held that national courts must safeguard the rights of individuals
against any disregard of the stand-still obligation by taking - in accor-
dance with the national law - all appropriate measures, such as declar-
99. Case 120/73, Lorenz v. Germany, 1973 E.C.R. 1471, 1483.
100. Case 77/595, Steinike and Weinlig v. Germany, 1977 E.C.R. 595, 611.
101. France v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-307; Case 142/87, Belgium v. Commission,
1990 E.C.R. 1-959; see supra, part II.D.
102. Case C-354/90, FNCEPA v. France, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5505.
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ing the implementation of the aid invalid, ordering the recovery of any
aid already paid, and other interim measures. The Court went on to state
that a subsequent final Commission decision does not legalize a posteri-
ori the invalid implementation of the aid. A contrary result, the Court
reasoned, would infringe upon the rights of individuals safeguarded by
the above stated measures of national courts, and would encourage
Member States to disregard the stand-still clause and deprive this provi-
sion of its effectiveness ("effet utile").10 3
This judgment considerably strengthens the possibility for private
parties to challenge a State aid measure implemented by the Member
State in breach of the stand-still clause. National courts can now order
recovery of the aid paid, and order other interim measures, even when
the article 93(2) procedure is still pending before the Commission. Such
orders taken by a national court are valid and cannot be revoked be-
cause the Commission, in a subsequent final decision, declares the aid
measure compatible with the Common Market. Private parties, especial-
ly competitors, may now challenge aid measures before national courts
with more efficiency and with less risk if; they know that these aid
measures were not notified to the Commission, or were implemented
prior to a final Commission decision. For the beneficiary of an aid, it is
now even more important to verify that the aid was notified by the
Member State and that no procedure under article 93(2) was opened by
the Commission.
CONCLUSION
In its latest decisions, the Court of Justice has continued developing
State aid law and has provided clarification on some procedural aspects.
In Boussac,'° the Court strengthened the Commission's position with
regard to State aids implemented by Member States in breach of the
stand-still clause in the last sentence of article 93(3). In FNCEPA v.
Commission, °5 the Court increased the right of individuals to challenge
aid measures before national courts which were implemented by Mem-
ber States in disregard of this stand-still clause. The Court's decision in
British Aerospace and Rover v. Commission106 confirmed the Court's
requirement that the Commission strictly observe the procedural rules.
Where the Commission has been given broad discretion, and where a
103. Id. at 1-5529.
.104. Case 301/87, France v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. 1-307.
105. FNCEPA v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-5505.
106. Case 292/90, British Aerospace and Rover v. Commission, I C.M.L.R. 853 (1992).
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complex economic assessment is involved, as is the case with regard to
State aid, competition, and antidumping cases, the Court of Justice is
reluctant to disturb the Commission's findings. Thus, it is all the more
important that the procedural rights of the parties involved are strictly
complied with.
In recent years, the Commission's State aid policy has become more
understandable to the general public. For example, the Commission now
publishes a summary of all cases dealt with in the Bulletin of the Euro-
pean Communities, issues press releases in the more important cases,
publishes all final decisions in the Official Journal, and gives notice in
the Official Journal of all cases in which proceedings are initiated.'
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Nevertheless, the procedural rights of recipients of an aid are insuffi-
cient. The recipients often do not know whether the government which
has given them aid has given notice to the Commission, even though it
is the recipients who will have to repay an illegally granted aid. Even if
they ascertain that notification has been made, they will not know what
objections the Commission has taken. They do not know how complete
the notification has been and what arguments have been used to support
it. Moreover, there is no obligation for the Commission during the two-
month preliminary period to invite third parties, especially the recipients,
to submit their comments. If the Commission decides to open the con-
tentious procedure they will not be informed individually. There is no
mandatory oral hearing during the contentious procedure, and the recipi-
ents do not have access to the Commission's files. Thus, the system, as
it presently stands, is unfair to the aided party, especially in cases where
the Commission examines an aid measure to be granted to an individual
undertaking.
In order to strengthen the procedural rights of recipients and third
parties, a new regulation, based upon article 94, outlining the application
of article 93(2) and (3), would be a solution. Regulations No. 17/62,
27/62 and 99/63, which govern the application of the competition rules,
could provide the necessary guidance."'
107. TWENTIETH REPORT, supra note 3, at 126-27.
108. Jon Slot, Procedural Aspects (if State Aids: The Guardian (?f Competition Versus the
Subsidy Villians?, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 741, 759 (1990).
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